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I.INTRODUCTION

As a result of deceptive trading and investment scandals that plagued
security transactions during the 1920s and 30s, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was created to protect investors.! Congress
passed the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)2 and later passed the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)3 in response to the
market crisis created by deceptive activities. The Securities Act applies to
new issues of securities and the Exchange Act regulates the trading of
securities in the secondary markets.4 Because both Acts deal only with
securities, a working definition of what constitutes a security is imperative
in determining whether the Acts apply. The definition of a security under
the 1933 Act states, "[wihen used in this title, unless the context otherwise
requires... [t]he term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond,... , investment contract ..... ,,The definition of a security under

1. See K. FRED SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 4 (2d ed. 1980).
2. See id. at 6; Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehimann, Introductory Comment: A
HistoricalIntroductionto the SecuritiesAct of 1933 and the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934,49
OHIo ST. L.J. 329, 329-30 (1988).
3. See infra notes 40-41, and accompanying text.
4. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 2, at 330.
5. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22,48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994) [hereinafter Securities Act]. The full definition is as follows:
Section 77b. When used in this subehapter, unless the context otherwise
requires...
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
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the Security Act differs slightly from that of the Exchange Act and defines
a security as "[w]hen used in this title, unless the context otherwise
requires... [t]he term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond,.... investment contract ....

.

For purposes of this Casenote, the slight differences in the definitions
are immaterial and the two definitions are considered equivalent.7
Although the definitions include familiar terms such as stocks, bonds,
notes, and "in general, any . . . instrument commonly known as a

security,"8 the statutory definition was written to encompass many different

debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
Id.
6. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
The full definition of security under the act is as follows:
Section 78c(a). When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
"security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id.
7. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975).
8. Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
FLORIDA L4WREVIEW

[Vol. 51

types of instruments and transactions that evade the explicit instruments
espoused in the definitions.
The United States Supreme Court has tackled the formidable task of
defining a security under the Security and Exchange Acts on many
occasions.9 In so doing, the court has created several tests which are
applied according to the type of instrument involved in a transaction. 0 The
statutory definition of a security cannot be all-inclusive because
unscrupulous individuals find many varying ways to raise capital under the
guise of unorthodox transactions. 1 Therefore, the Court, in an attempt to
keep in stride with these transactions, has adjusted old tests or created new
tests which evaluate the substance instead of the form of the transaction.12
Nevertheless, the lack of uniformity that results from this ad hoc method
of review is problematic because investors cannot, with predictability,
determine if the transactions they engage in are within the scope of the
Security and Exchange Acts. In view of the varying tests available to the

9. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (evaluating promissory notes of a
farmers' cooperative under the family resemblance test); Gouldv. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985)
(holding stock to be a security under the acts when 50% of the stock of a closely held corporation
was sold); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (holding 100% sale of stock of
company constitutes a sale of a security); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding
certificates of deposit and guaranty agreements are not securities under the Act); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (holding Security and Exchange Acts do not apply to
compulsory, noncontributory pension plans because they are not investment contracts); Forman,
421 U.S. at 837 (explaining that shares of stock allowing purchasers to lease housing in a state
subsidized nonprofit housing cooperative were not "securities" following the Howey test and
addressing the risk capital analysis); SEC v. W.J.Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946) (holding
units of citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating and marketing is a
"security").
10. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 56 (evaluating promissory notes of a farmers' cooperative under
the family resemblance test); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 681 (holding 100% sale of stock of company
involved the sale of a security); Weaver, 455 U.S. at 551 (holding certificates of deposit and
guaranty agreements are not securities when taking into account the "context clause"); Daniel,439
U.S. at 551 (holding Security and Exchange Acts do not apply to compulsory, noncontributory
pension plans because they are not investment contracts); Forman,421 U.S. at 837 (following the
Howey test and addressing the risk capital analysis); Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300 (defining an
investment contract, using what has come to be known as the Howey test).
11. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 681 (holding 100% sale of stock of company involved the sale
of a security); Weaver, 455 U.S. at 551 (holding certificates of deposit and guaranty agreements are
not securities under the Act); Daniel,439 U.S. at 551 (holding Security and Exchange Acts do not
apply to compulsory, noncontributory pension plans, because they are not investment contracts);
Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (holding units of citrus grove development coupled with a contract for
cultivating and marketing is a "security").
12. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 56 (promissory notes of a farmers' cooperative evaluated under
the family resemblance test); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 681 (holding 100% sale of stock of company
involved the sale of a security); Weaver, 455 U.S. at 551 (holding certificates of deposit and
guaranty agreements are not securities when taking into account the "context clause"); Howey, 328
U.S. at 293 (defining an investment contract with the Howey test).
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judiciary, the legislature can achieve the intended purpose of the Acts by
any transaction that satisfies the
rewriting the definition of a security to be
3 e
Howey
modified
slightly
elements of a
The Howey test was promulgated by the Supreme Court to determine
whether a transaction, not under the guise of an enumerated instrument in
the definition of the Acts, is a security. The Court has stated four
elements15 that courts must examine to quantify whether a transaction
involves a security. In applying the Howey test, the courts look at the
following elements: 1) an investment of money; 2) in a common
enterprise; 3) with an expectation of profits; 4) solely from the efforts of
the promoter or of someone other than themselves. 6 An investment
contract was not defined in the Acts by Congress; therefore, the Supreme
Court promulgated the Howey test in an effort to create a definition.17 The
Court stated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. that although the term "'investment
contract' is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legislation
reports .... It had been broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the
investing public a full measure of protection.""8 Thus, the Howey test
became the catch-all test for transactions involving instruments not
specifically provided for in the Acts.
In applying the Howey test, the form of the transaction was disregarded
and the courts looked to the underlying economic reality of the
transaction.19 The Court in Howey stated that "[a]n investment contract
thus came to mean a contract or scheme for 'the placing of capital or laying
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment."'" With this view in mind, the elements of the Howey test

13. See 328 U.S. at 299-300.
14. Other proponents have proffered a method of opting out of the securities regulations for
certain types of transactions. See, e.g., Park McGinty, The LimitedLiabilityCompany: Opportunity
for Selective SecuritiesLaw Deregulation,64 U. CIN. L. REv. 369 (1996) (suggesting investors of
limited liabilities should be allowed to opt out of the securities laws coverage); Larry E. Ribstein,
Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of Limited Liability Companies,
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (1994) (advocating the adoption of a private ordering approach that
permits parties to determine whether the securities laws apply); cf. Elaine A. Welle, Freedom Of
ContractAndThe SecuritiesLaws: OptingOut Of SecuritiesRegulation By PrivateAgreement, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1999) (arguing against selective deregulation).
15. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300. The Court stated that for an investment contract to be
a security covered by the Acts the following four factors must be met: 1) an investment of money;
2) in a common enterprise; 3) with an expectation of profits; 4) solely from the efforts of the
promoter or of someone other than themselves. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Securities Act at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); see also Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1994).
18. Howey, 328 U.S. at 297.
19. See id.
20. Id. (citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937,938 (Minn. 1920)).
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represented the fundamental elements found in any security covered by the
Acts. Therefore, in the broadest sense, the Howey test can be used to
identify a security regardless of the form used in the transaction. In
determining whether a transaction involves a security, the court must
always look to the underlying economic reality of the transaction, and
indeed does so, as can be seen in the various tests promulgated by the
Supreme Court.'
This Casenote explores the definition of a security under the Acts and
suggests that one test is adequate in defining a security. Part II of this
Casenote addresses the social and economic realities that led to and
established the need for the promulgation of the Acts. In addition, Part I
addresses the purpose of the Acts and establishes the intended beneficiaries
of the Acts. Once a determination of these initial factors are established,
Part HI explores the current tests used in defining a security and their
associated shortcomings. Part IV discusses the need to rewrite the
definition of a security under the Acts, in light of a single test: Howey.
Finally, Part V addresses the application of the Howey test to specific
transactions to establish that only one test is necessary to determine if a
transaction qualifies as a security under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE 1933 AND 1934 AcTs
A. Social andEconomic Climate Before the Acts
During the early 20th century, businesses engaged in bartering and
consisted mostly of family-owned enterprises.'2 World War I created a
need for investment capital for expansion and growth.' Regulation of the
securities market was left to the states under "blue sky" laws.' Such laws
21. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (finding that the
economic reality of a transaction involving the purchase of stock was not for an investment but to
secure government subsidized housing).
22. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 1.Business organizations were conducted by individuals
as sole proprietorships or partnerships with very little need for venture capital. See id. External
financial reporting was a moot point because very few business enterprises raised capital for growth.
See id. Most businesses operated on a micro-economic level providing goods and services to the

local community. See id.
23. See id. at 5. With the onset and passing ofWorld War I, businesses flourished in support
of the war and companies blossomed. See id. at 2. The investment capital market was born in
recognition of the need for capital. See id. Because ownership and management could be separated,
the corporate form became the organizational choice for most businesses. See id. As the growing
companies switched to the corporate form, the risk of ownership was spread among the general
population by the sale of securities through the securities market. See id.
24. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 2, at 331-32. State regulation began 20 years earlier
than federal regulations. See id. The early laws promulgated by the states were known as "blue sky"
laws. See id. "Blue sky" laws are divided into two categories, fraud and regulatory laws. See id.
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proved inadequate due to disparities in regulations among the states.' The
absence of federal regulations and disparity in state legislation provided
fertile ground for fraudulent and deceptive trading in securities leading to
illusory market strength.2 6 Several factors produced the deceptive strength
of the market during this time. These factors included price manipulation,
margin buying, misuse of corporate information, and excessive demand for
securities.'

Under the fraud laws, states could seek to enjoin unscrupulous activities and impose penalties for
fraudulent activities. See id. Under the regulatory laws, states could prohibit the sale of securities
until the issuer filed an application and received approval from the state to issue the securities. See
id.
25. See SKOUSEN, supranote 1, at 3. The effectiveness of "blue sky" laws were hampered by
the fact that some states did not promulgate laws, and the ones that did were not effective against
fraudulent and deceptive trading. See id. It was found that "the most effective and widely used
method of evading the provision of state blue-sky laws was operating across state lines." Id.
(quoting DEP'T COMMERCE, A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED
FEDERALSECuRTIE ACT,FederalSecuritiesAct,HearingsonH.R. 4314 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Congress, 1st Sess. 85, 100 (1933), reprintedin 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933 AND SECURiES EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934
(J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, eds. 1973)).
26. See SKOUSEN, supranote 1, at 3-4. Even though the laws were on the state books, there
was reluctance by the state legislatures to enforce the laws. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note
2, at 332. Complicating the enforcement process was the unwillingness of victims to prosecute
offenders. See id. Generally, when a state agency would begin an investigation to build a case
against the corporation, the corporation would partially repay victims for their losses. See id. In
most cases, the state would lose its witness and prosecution was made impossible. See id.
27. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 4. The use of wash sales allowed brokers and dealers to
reap large profits by falsely driving the price of securities up. See id. By creating false buying and
selling, brokers would create activity in individual securities. See id. The brokers would then reap
large profits before the price of the security fell to its natural value. See id. In conjunction with price
manipulation, insider trading created instability in the market. See id. Corporate insiders would
withhold information in order to take advantage of price fluctuations created by the impending
release of information. See id. Two additional factors that led to the great crash of the 1920s were
the buying of securities on margin and false demand for securities. See id. The purchase of stocks
through margin refers to the buying of securities on credit. See id.; see also John R. Dorfman, The
Next Century: Market Crash?What's That?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1996, at Cl (explaining that
typically, 10% of the purchase price was all that was necessary to purchase securities on credit). As
the market flourished, credit purchases were the norm. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1,at4. There were
no limitations on the amount of credit an investor could receive from a broker. See id.Therefore,
slight changes in the market price of a security would cause large changes in the valuation of
security positions causing investors to sell securities to cover the margins. See id. The dumping of
securities caused a chain reaction of selling dragging the market down. See id. Brokers also
promised prosperity and riches for all, spurring a high demand for securities. See id. In order to
meet this demand, investment bankers forced corporations to issue new securities to raise
unnecessary capital. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 1.2., at 2-3 (1933), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S.

Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, eds. 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Such behavior
resulted in unnecessary fixed charges upon industry. See id. Corporations could not provide returns
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Due to the unscrupulous dealings and the social and economic climate
during the 1920s, the market was ripe for the "Great Crash." In October of
1929, the American people experienced one of the greatest tragedies of the
economic revolution.'
B. Introductionto the Acts andthe Acts' Intended Beneficiaries
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and 1930, the Senate
authorized the Banking and Currency Committee to investigate the
securities industry. 9 The following factors and deficiencies were discussed
in a report to the House of Representatives from the Banking and Currency
Committee: The committee found that "[d]uring the postwar decade some
50 billion of new securities were floated in the United States";' the
committee found that "half or $25,000,000,000 worth of securities floated
during this period have been proved to be worthless";" the shear
magnitude of the worthless securities created a "tragedy in the lives of

thousands of individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated after

years of effort, in these worthless securities";32 the security fiasco "was
made possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters
and dealers in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent
dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of investment in any
enterprise."33 In response to the improprieties in security trading over the

on invested capital to support stock prices, thus stock prices fell. See id The coupled effect of these
factors resulted in an unstable market creating the proverbial "house of cards" waiting to crumble.
As stock prices declined, margin purchasers began to sell their holdings to cover their debt. See
SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 4. These sales led to a snowball effect perpetuating one of the greatest
sell-offs in market history. See id.
28. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 4. Prior to the stock market crash in October of 1929, the
aggregate value of all outstanding securities was over $80 billion. See id. at 5. In 1932, after the
crash and the ensuing depression, the aggregate value of stocks had dropped to $15 billion. See id.
Between 1925 and 1929, the prices of stock on the New York Stock Exchange more than doubled
in value. See OURTIMES: THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OFTHE 20TH CENTURY 206 (Century Books,
Inc. et al. eds., 1995). These soaring stock prices caused thousands to begin speculating or to buy
large amounts of stock in order to make enormous profits. See id. The large amounts of money
thrown into the stock market ended up causing "The Great Depression" in the United States. On
October 24, 1929, known as "Black Thursday," the stock market nearly collapsed as millions of
people began withdrawing money in fear of losing it all. See id. After 'Black Thursday" stocks
dropped once again and a record number of shares were sold. See id. Thousands of people lost huge
sums of money and soon banks and businesses started to fold. See id. Some, so unnerved by the
crash, jumped out of buildings. See id.
29. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 5.
30. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 1.2., at 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 27).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id.
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past decade the federal government promulgated the Security and
Exchange Acts to protect all investors. In support of the proposed
legislation for securities regulation, President Roosevelt sent this message
to Congress:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal
supervision of traffic in investment securities in interstate
commerce.
In spite of many state statutes the public in the past has
sustained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor
honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling
securities.
Th'ere is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that
every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce
shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and
that no essentially important element attending an issue shall
be concealed from the buying public.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the
public with the least possible interference to honest
business.'
On May 27, 1933 the Securities Act was passed to protect investors
during the initial offering of a security. 35 The Securities Act has two basic
objectives: to provide the investor with enough information to make a
sound economic decision in purchasing a security, and to hold the issuers
liable for any misstatements or any other fraudulent activities in the
issuance of securities.36
The principal means of accomplishing these objectives is requiring
dealers, underwriters, etc. to fully and fairly disclose financial information
by registering both offers and sales of securities. 37 Most offerings of debt
and equity securities circulated by corporations and other issuers must be
registered. 3' However, certain transactions qualify for exemption from the

34. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. I.1., at 1-2 (1933), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 27.

35. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 2, at 342.
36. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 19.
37. See id.

38. See H.R. REP. No.73-85, pt. II.1., at 5-6. To achieve the Acts goals, the SEC requires full
and fair disclosure of information necessary for an investor to make an informed decision. See id.
The SEC in requiring these disclosures is not guaranteeing or approving any particular security
issued. See id. Severe civil penalties for false or misleading information help to achieve the acts
second objective. See id. Issuers engage in self regulation to insure that the disclosures do not
contain false or misleading information. See id.
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registration provisions.39
Soon after passing the Securities Act, Congress moved to regulate the
trading of securities on the secondary markets by passing the Exchange

Act.' The primary objective of the Exchange Act is to regulate market
manipulation and speculation.41 Based on the legislative history and the

conditions leading up to the enactment of the Acts, the primary
beneficiaries of the Acts are the investing public.42 The investing public
relies on the trust and fiduciary duties owed to them by brokers,
underwriters, and corporate insiders.43 By creating a system of reporting
and self regulation, market stability is achieved." As stated previously, the
application of the Acts to a transaction is not invoked unless the

transaction deals with a security.45

C. Summary
In summary, the primary purpose of passing the Acts was to create a

uniform federal remedy for transactions that involve dealings in
securities.' Congress' primary intent for the Acts is to protect average
investors from unscrupulous individuals.47 The Acts protect investors
during initial offerings of securities and also in the ongoing trading and

reporting.48 The securities arena has become global in nature, making it

imperative for Congress to regulate the trading of securities. Stable and

39. See id., pt. 11.2., at 6-7. In general, registration requirements apply to all securities
whether U.S. or foreign companies as long as they are sold in the U.S. security markets. See id., pt.
I1.1., at 5-6. However, not all securities listed under the Act must be registered with the
commission. The Act exempts securities "where there is no practical need for its application or
where the public benefits are too remote." Id. There are two types of exemptions from the Security
Act's registration requirement. Either the securities themselves are exempt or the transaction in
which the security is being sold fits into an exemption. See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 21.
40. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 2, at 347. The Exchange Act also established the
Securities and Exchange Commission. See id.
41. See id. at 348. In regulating the secondary markets, the Exchange Act requires periodic
filing of financial information as well as an annual financial report. See id at 350. The Exchange
Act forbids practices such as wash sales and matched orders, fraudulent inducement to trade based
upon misleading or false information, and misuse of pro forma financial statements. See id. at 348.
Generally, the Exchange Act seeks to detect and eliminate any fraudulent schemes or plots to
manipulate the price of a security for personal gain. See id. The Act also regulates margin trading
by instructing the Federal Reserve Board to regulate the use of borrowed money in the buying of
stock in the markets. See id. at 347.
42. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 29-36 and 40-41.
46. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 36 and 41 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss2/3

10

Globerman: The Elusive and Changing Definition of a Security: One Test Fits
1999]

DEFINITION OFA SECURITY

reliable markets are necessary to ensure the health and welfare of this
nation and the people in this nation.
Ill. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION AND THE VARYING
TESTS USED TO INTERPREr THE DEFINITION

The definition of a security stems from the statutory definition as set
forth by the Acts.4 9 Section 77b of the Securities Act and section 78c(a) of
the Exchange Act begin with the language "unless the context otherwise
requires" which is referred to as the context clause. The context clause
language is used by the courts to evaluate the underlying economic reality
of the transaction.5" The remaining language of the definition sets out
specific instruments that qualify as a security under the Acts. For example,
the definition makes reference to specific types of instruments such as
stocks or bonds.52 The definition also makes reference to broad undefined
instruments that are used to capture unorthodox transactions not within the
purview of a typical security.53
The statutory definitions are over-inclusive by nature because they
specifically set out many instruments that are to be treated as securities. A
security in the form of a stock or bond, if taken in their most literal sense,
creates an over-inclusive definition because the courts would ignore the
substance of the transaction relying solely on the form. In balancing the
over-inclusive nature of a literal interpretation, Congress included the
context clause which has been interpreted by the courts as a method to
remove transactions from the Acts' coverage. These simple words have
allowed the judiciary to look to the underlying economic reality of the
transaction in relation to the specific facts of a case at bar.54
A. Statutory Scheme
The Securities and Exchange Acts apply to all securities sold to the
investing public, subject to some exceptions, and all securities traded on
the secondary markets. As stated in the introduction, the definitions of a
security for application of the Acts are essentially identical. 55 The statutory

49. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. The courts have used the "investment
contract" instrument to capture many transactions that do not fit squarely within one of the
traditional types of securities such as stocks or bonds. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (discussing investment contracts).
54. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
55. See United States Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 51

definition is broad enough to cover awide range of transactions56 involving
the obvious types of securities such as stocks, bonds, and debentures.57
Furthermore, the definition is also written broadly enough, by including
terms such as an "investment contract," 58 to reach transactions intended to
avoid governance by the Acts.59
At first glance, the definition of securities, under the Acts, seems all
encompassing. However, what seems to be a straightforward inclusion,
such as a stock or bond, has created great confusion in the courts. This
confusion is created when the substance of the transaction does not support
a finding that the transaction is a security.' Therefore, not all transactions
involving a straightforward inclusion should be held to be a security.6 1 In
evaluating a transaction, a court must look to the substance of the
underlying transaction instead of the form in determining whether the
transaction is a security.62 Evaluating a transaction in conjunction with the

56. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (evaluating promissory notes of a
farmers' cooperative underthe family resemblance test); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985)
(holding 50% sale of stock of a closely held corporation involved a security under the acts);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (holding 100% sale of stock of company
involved securities); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that certificates of
deposit and guaranty agreements are not a securities within the meaning of the Act); Daniel, 439
U.S. at 551 (holding Security and Exchange Acts do not apply to compulsory, noncontributory
pension plans because they are not investment contracts); Forman, 421 U.S. at 837 (holding shares
of stock allowing purchasers to lease housing in a state subsidized nonprofit housing cooperative
were not securities under the Howey test or the risk capital analysis); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946) (holding units of citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating
and marketing is a "security").
57. See Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994). However, these types of securities
have caused the courts to fashion tests to determine if the underlying transaction supports the
presumption of a security. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 56 (holding that demand promissory notes
in a farmer's cooperative are securities under the family resemblance test); Forman, 421 U.S. at 837
(holding that a stock in a cooperative housing development is not a security under the Acts because
the economic reality of the transaction was not for investment purposes).
58. See Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994).
59. See, e.g., Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (holding units of citrus grove development coupled
with a contract for cultivating and marketing is a "security"); L & B Hosp. Ventures, Inc. v.
Healthcare Int'l, Inc., 894 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that limited partners who brought suit
under the Acts had status to bring action under the Acts); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding pyramid investing scheme was a security under an "investment

contract").
60. See Forman,421 U.S. at 837 (holding that the purchase of stock in order to acquire an
apartment was not a security under the definition of the Acts even though in form the transaction
dealt with "stock").
61. See, e.g., id. (holding purchasers of a stock to secure subsidized housing did not purchase
a security covered by the Acts).
62. See id. at 847-48. The Forman Court explained:
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to articulate the relevant

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss2/3

12

Globerman: The Elusive and Changing Definition of a Security: One Test Fits
DEFINITION OF A SECURITY

"context clause" provides the courts with a method for looking at the
substance instead of the form.63 In so doing, the underlying purpose of
protecting investors under the Acts will be better served by avoiding an
over- or under-inclusive definition of a security.
B. Context Clause
The definitions of a security under the Securities and Exchange Acts
start off with the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires."' This
phrase is known as the "context clause." The Supreme Court has held that
in determining whether transactions are securities, the economic reality65
of transactions must be considered." In UnitedHousingFoundation,Inc.
v. Forman,67 the court held that a stock is presumptively a security;
however, the presumption can be rebutted by the economic realities

economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities," rather, it
sought to define the "term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as
to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.
Id.; see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 60. Congress did not intend to treat consumer credit card debt and
home mortgages similar to debt instruments and notes. See id. at 65. The latter is used to raise
capital from the investing public in order to fund operations or expand the existing enterprise. See
id. The former is not an investment by the public but merely a vehicle used for the purchase of
property and services. See id.
63. The context clause allows the Court to examine a transaction in substance disregarding
the name attached to the transaction. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). In Forman,
the purchase of a security, "stock," was necessary to secure housing in a government subsidized
housing complex. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 842. The court, in determining that the form does not
govern the transaction, stated, "[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in
the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on the economic
reality." Id. at 848 (alterations in original) (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967)). Had the Court taken a literal interpretation of the definition of a security, the stock
involved in Formanwould fall under the coverage of the Securities Act. However, the Court stated
that even though the name given to a transaction is not dispositive, they are not suggesting that the
name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether the transaction is a security. See id.at 851. The
court seems to be suggesting that the 'context clause' should be used to remove a transaction from
the scope of the Act by looking at the substance of the transaction over the form.
64. Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(10) (1994).
65. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 61. The court stated, "In discharging our duty, we are not bound
by legal formalisms, but instead take account of the economics of the transaction under
investigation." Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.; see also Weaver,455 U.S. at 558-559 ('The
definition of 'security'... provides that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep
of the Act is not to be considered a security if the context otherwise requires.").
67. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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underlying the transaction. 68 The Court in MarineBank v. Weaver,69 held
that even though certificates of deposit fell within the statutory definition
of a security, it was "unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of
deposit to liability under the antifraud provision of the federal securities
laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly
protected under the federal banking laws."7 Thus, the court used the
context clause to remove the transaction from the Acts coverage.71
The "context clause" language provides the courts with an avenue to
look at the economic realities of the underlying transaction. Without
interpreting this clause to mean the context of the underlying transaction;
courts will be forced to follow a literal interpretation of the statutory
definition. Thus, the stock in Fonnan72 would be considered a security
under the Acts. Such a result would create an over-inclusive definition
contrary to Congressional intent. While Congress enacted the regulations
to protect investors, they did not intend to address fraud which may be
present in transactions not included under the Acts.73
C. Investment Contract-TheHowey Test
After the security laws were enacted, Supreme Court cases focused
mainly on the investment contract portion of the statutory definition, rather
than on the more traditional forms of securities such as stocks or bonds.74
Therefore, the SEC needed an avenue to help capture these unorthodox
transactions and bring them into the Acts' coverage. As the SEC noted in
its brief for the Howey case, "[t]he efficient enforcement of [the securities
acts] in the field of stocks and bonds has driven [fraudulent] promoters into
veiled and devious ways of accomplishing their ends."75 The statutory

68. See id. at 847-51. The court held that the stock involved in the case lacked the traditional
characteristics associated with a stock. See id. at 851. They were not negotiable, could not be
pledged, conferred no voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, and could not
appreciate in value. See id. Therefore, the presumption of a stock was rebutted.
69. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
70. Id. at 559.
71. See id. at 556.
72. 421 U.S. at 837.
73. See Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,556 (1982). The Court, in Weaver, stated, "[W]e are satisfied
that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for
all fraud." Id.
74. See, e.g., Forman, 421 U.S. at 837 (holding that stock purchased in acquiring housing
is not a security); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that
apyramid investment scheme is asecurity underthe investment contract analysis); Howey, 328 U.S.
at 293 (finding that a land purchase coupled with a marketing contract is a security under an
"investment contract").
75. Park McGinty, What is a Security, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1033,1042 (alterations in original)
(quoting Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 40, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
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definition of a security contains the phrase "investment contract" which
has been broadly interpreted to capture all devious schemes. The term
"investment contract," included in the statutory definition, has no meaning
in a commercial context. The drafters of the Securities Act borrowed the
concept from state "blue sky" laws.76 The most prominent case defining an
"investment77 contract" by the Supreme Court occurred in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.

In Howey, the corporation was in the business of raising orange trees,
and harvesting and marketing the crops.78 In helping to finance their
79
operations, the company offered half of the groves for sale to the public.
Each prospective customer was offered aland sales contract in conjunction
with a service contract, to harvest and market the crop on their land. °
Investors were told that it would not be feasible to invest in the land
without the service contract," as most of the purchasers were non-residents
of Florida, where the land was located.82 In addition, the individual owners
had no right to enter the land without the consent of the company.83 All the
produce reaped from the land was pooled together and profits were
allocated based upon a check made at the time of picking."
The court, in determining that the sale of land coupled with the service
contract constituted a "security," provided a general definition of
"investment contract."85 The court defined an investment contract as an
arrangement whereby investors provide capital for a common enterprise
and are led to expect profits solely from the efforts of others.86 This
definition became known as the Howey test. Over a period of years, each
element of the Howey test had been developed and refined to provide a
working test for the most unorthodox transactions.
1. Investment in Money
The statement "an investment in money," at first glance, appears to be
simplistic and easily definable. An investment in "money" refers to the

U.S. 293 (1946) (No. 45-843)).
76. See MARC I. STEINBERG, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES INSECURmTES REGWLATION 8 (1988).

77.
78.
79.
80.

See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300 (defining an investment contract).
See id.
See id. at 295.
See id.

81. See id. at 295.

82. See idat 296.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 298-99.

86. See id.
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laying out of something of value. 7 The Acts cover all offers and sales
regardless of the consideration that is paid in the bargain. 8 However, the
"investment" portion of the element is more difficult to define. Black's
Law Dictionarydefines "investment" as:
An expenditure to acquire property or other assets in order to
produce revenue; the asset so acquired. The placing of capital
or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or
profit from its employment. To purchase securities of a more
or less permanent nature, or to place money or property in
business ventures or real estate, or otherwise lay it out, so that
it may produce revenue or gain (or both) in the future. 9
Thus, for an "investment" to exist, the purchaser must have some
expectation of a return of revenue or gain in the future as stated in Black's
definition. An example of the court wrestling with the investment
definition occurred in Forman.' In Forman,the Court held that the stock
in question was not a security because "investors were attracted solely by
the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on
their investments."9
2. Common Enterprise
In Howey, the Court stated that a common enterprise managed by the
corporation orby third parties was essential if the investors were to achieve
their expectations of profit from their investment.92 This statement seems
to imply that vertical commonality93 is adequate to establish a common
enterprise but, it is still unclear whether vertical commonality is
sufficient.94 The Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
87. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
88. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979). The court, in
Daniel, stated that in finding a security under the Acts "in every case the purchaser gave up some
tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the

characteristics of a security." Id.
89. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 825 (6th ed. 1990).
90. See 421 U.S. at 863.
91. Id. at 853; see also Daniel, 439 U.S. at 552 (explaining that from the standpoint of
economic realities, an employee is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment

for the future).
92. See SEC v. W.L Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,300 (1946).
93. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87-88 (2nd Cir. 1994) (distinguishing
between broad and strict vertical commonality). Under broad vertical commonality, the "fortunes
of the investors need be linked only to the efforts of the promoter." Id. at 88. Under strict vertical
commonality, the fortunes of the investor are tied directly to the fortunes of the promoter. See id.
94. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether vertical or horizontal commonality is
necessary to satisfy the common enterprise element. Thus, there is a split of authority among the
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Inc.,95 held that "a common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the
investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success
of those seeking the investment or of third parties."' The Turner holding
was also followed by the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc.97 The Turner scheme involved multiple investors, but each investor's
fortunes were not pooled with other investors. 8 Each investor profited by
bringing in other potential investors. 99 The Turner structure was
representative of vertical commonality and seems to indicate that a
transaction between a single promoter and single investor will suffice."
Contrary to the decisions of the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit
adopted the view that horizontal commonality is necessary to satisfy the
common enterprise element and broad vertical commonality is not
enough.'O To date, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of
horizontal and vertical commonality. Until such time, confusion will
persist.
Looking back to the underlying intent of the legislation, the reach of the
Securities and Exchange Acts should cover all transactions that attempt to
defraud public investors. It should not matter whether the scheme involves

appellate circuits as to which commonality is necessary to satisfy the common enterprise prong of
the Howey test.
95. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
96. Id. at 482 n.7; see also Koscot, 497 F.2d at 479 ("[The fact that an investor's return is
independent of that of other investors in the scheme is not decisive. Rather, the requisite
commonality is evidenced by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the
efficacy of the Koscot meetings and guidelines on recruiting prospects and consummating a sale.")
In Turner, the investor purchases into a plan that allows him to attend seminars on self-motivation
and self-improvement. See 474 F.2d at 472. In addition to these benefits, the purchaser is also given
the opportunity to sell the courses to others. See id. The scheme in Turneris similar to a pyramid
scheme. New investors bring potential investors to the seminar to hear how these course are a sure
route to great riches. See id. This type of investment setup is analogous to a hub and spoke
relationship. The investors fortunes are not required to rise and fall together and a pro-rata sharing
of profits and losses are not required.
97. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
98. See Turner,474 F.2d at 478.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2nd Cir. 1994). The court in Revak held
that the common enterprise element in Howey can be established by a showing of horizontal
commonality. See id. Horizontal commonality ties the fortunes of each investor together and
"horizontal commonality requires a sharing or pooling of funds." Id. The Second Circuit rejected
broad vertical commonality in meeting the Howey requirement foracommon enterprise. See id. The
Revak court distinguished between broad and strict vertical commonality. See id. at 88. Under strict
vertical commonality, the fortunes of the investor are tied directly to the fortunes of the promoter.
See id. Under broad vertical commonality, the "fortunes of the investors need be linked only to the
efforts of the promoter." Id. The court did not address the issue of whether strict vertical
commonality was enough to meet the common enterprise element. See id.
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one investor and one promoter, as in vertical commonality situations, or

multiple investors pooling their assets to derive a profit allocable to all
investors, as in a horizontal commonality scheme. The objective of the
Securities Act was to protect the investing public from misrepresentation
and fraud in the offering of a security.1' 2 Therefore, both vertical and
horizontal commonality should suffice in meeting the common enterprise
element.

3. Expectation of Profits
In Howey, the Court held that the investors bought the tract of land and
the service contract with the expectation of a return on their investment.103
Thus, to meet the requirements of the element, the investor would have to
have some expectation of receiving a return on his investment. Two
additional cases that addressed the expectation of profit element were
0
Forman"' and InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Daniel."
In Forman,prospective purchasers of government-subsidized housing
were required to purchase eighteen shares of Riverbay stock for each room
desired at a price of $25 per share." 6 In holding that the stock did not
constitute an investment contract, the court stated that to be an investment
contract, the contract must involve an "investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the

entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."' 7 The court held that the

tenant was not acquiring an investment in the ordinary sense, but merely
a place to live.08
The Supreme Court also examined the "expectation of profits" element
102. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
103. See 328 U.S. at 300. The court held that the company was offering an opportunity for
investors to contribute money and share in the profits of the enterprise. See id. The investors had
no expectation to occupy the land and cultivate the crop on their own. See id. Instead, they were
relying on the expertise of the company who owned the requisite equipment necessary to harvest
the crops. See iL
104. See 421 U.S. at 839.
105. See 439 U.S. at 560.
106. See 421 U.S. at 838. The shares can not be transferred to a non-tenant, pledged,
encumbered, or bequeathed, and contain no voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
obtained. See id. Upon termination of occupancy, the tenant is required to sell his shares back to
the company at the original purchase price. See id. In the event that the company refuses to
purchase the shares, the tenant may sell the shares to a prospective tenant at the original purchase
price plus a fraction of the mortgage amortization that he has paid during his tenancy. See id.
107. Id. at 839. The court held that neither of the kinds of profits expected by investors were
found in the transaction. See id. The investor could not receive appreciation in the value of the stock
nor expect revenues from their investment. See id. In fact, the information bulletin distributed to
prospective tenants stressed the non-profit nature of the project and the focus was on the ability to
acquire a place to live. See id.
108. See id.
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in Daniel.'9Danielinvolved a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan
in which employees of the company were required to participate in the
plan."0 Overtime collective bargaining agreements required minimum
employer contribution amounts leading to higher benefits.11
"' The Court in
holding that the transaction was not a security under the Securities Act
stated that the pension plan did expect some earnings on its investment but
the majority of the fund's assets were derived from employer
contributions." ' The Court went on to state that an employee's expectation
of benefits were not derived from the expectation of profits, instead, they
were derived from the fact that the employee must meet certain conditions
to be eligible to collect a pension upon retirement."'
Thus, the Court focused on the small percentage of income earned
4 Furthermore, the Court found that
relative to the employer contributions.' "'
the expectation of receiving any benefit from the fund rested solely on the
vesting requirements rather than on the earnings generated by the fund's
assets. ' Therefore, the employees could not
have an expectation of profits
16
plan.
pension
non-contributory
the
from
The common thread among these cases is the investor's expectation
prior to entering into the transaction. In Howey, the investor expected to
invest the money to receive future profits." 7 In Forman, the purchaser of
the housing cooperative had no expectation to make a profit from the stock
purchased;" 8 they were merely meeting the conditions to acquire a place

109. Daniel,439 U.S. at 551.
110. See id. at 553. In 1954, a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement resulted in a
pension plan for employees represented by the union. See id. at 554. The employees paid nothing
to the plan and union representatives were given sole discretion to determine the amount of benefits
each retiree received. See id. In the beginning the representatives had no authority over the amount
to be contributed by the employer. See id.
111. See id. at 554. Initially, employee benefits were $75 per month and over time payments
ranged from $425 to $525 depending on age at retirement. See id. In order to receive a pension an
employee was required to work a minimum of 20 years. See id. The issue in this case centered upon
an employee who had a five month break in service during which no contributions were made on
his behalf. See id. at 555. When plaintiff later retired, he was refused benefits due to the break in
service. See id. Plaintiff sued under the theory of misrepresentation in the sale of a security. See id.
112. See id. at 561. "In the case of a pension fund ... a far larger portion of its income comes
from employer contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the Fund's managers."
Id. at 562. Pension funds also differ from schemes where promoter's manage other peoples money
because any shortfalls in the fund are covered by increased employer contributions. See id.
113. See id. In order to be eligible to collect a pension an employee must provide 20 years of
continual service to the company including time worked before the start of the plan. See id. at 554.
114. See iL at 562.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See 328 U.S. at 299.
118. See421U.S. at839.
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to live.11 9 In Daniel, the employees did not have independent pension
accounts where the amount of retirement benefits depended on the account
balances; instead, the fund's assets were pooled and the amount paid was
defined by the number of years of service.120 The fund's balance was not
pertinent to the amount of benefits, any shortfall would be covered by the
employer through contributions.' Therefore, in order to meet the element
of expectation of profit, the investor must lay out some form of
consideration with the expectation to gain a return on that investment.
4. Solely from the Efforts of Others
"Solely from the efforts of others," taken in its most literal sense would
require that the investor look completely to the promoter for her
expectation of profits."' Could the Court, in Howey, have meant such a
literal interpretation? In Howey, the court gave meaning to this element by
stating, "[a] common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties
with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the
investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their
investments."'2 The Howey court did not indicate whether a strict literal
interpretation should be taken. The investors in Howey did not participate
in the operation of the grove;" therefore, it is not clear whether investor
participation would make any difference. The Court has not defined the
breadth of "solely" in any subsequent holdings.
However, the issue has
5
been addressed by several circuit courts.1
In Koscot, the investment scheme involved a multi-level network of
independent distributors of cosmetics.'26 The trial court held that the
scheme did not constitute an investment contract because the expectation
ofprofits were not generated solely from the efforts of others. 27 The circuit

119. See id.
120. See 439 U.S. at 554 n.3.
121. See id. at 554.
122. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
123. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
124. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., SECv. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,497 F.2d473 (5th Cir. 1974); SECv. Glenn
W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476,481-82 (9th Cir. 1973).
126. See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 475. The lowest level in the pyramid is a beauty advisor who
derives all income from the retail sale of cosmetics. See id.The second level is comprised of
supervisors who can sell directly to the public or to other beauty advisors. See id. Supervisors also
receive bonuses by bringing in new members to the pyramid. See id. The last level consists of
distributors who sell directly to supervisors and beauty advisors as well as receiving bonuses for
recruiting new members. See id. The majority of the profit from the scheme is derived from the
recruitment of new members and not the sale of cosmetics. See id. at 476.
127. See id. at477. The district court did not address the first two elements of the Howey test,
because they made a finding that the facts did not support the third element. See id.
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court reversed the holding of the lower court, finding that the investment
scheme was a security. 128 The Fifth Circuit stated that the purpose of the
Securities Act was remedial in nature and therefore should be broadly
construed. 21 In reversing the decision of the trial court, the circuit court
held that participation by the investors does not remove the scheme from
the reach of the Act.130 The circuit court stated that the inquiry to determine
whether the "solely from the efforts of others" element is met should be
"whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect
131
enterprise.'
the
of
success
or
failure
the
The court in Turnerfaced similar facts and circumstances as the Koscot
court. 32 The court, in reaching a determination that the investment scheme
was a security, stated that "the remedial nature of the legislation," the
"policy of... broad protection... ," and the Supreme Court's holding that
the definition of a security should be flexible, support the idea that "the
word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the
definition ....
but rather must be construed realistically.... to include...
those schemes which.., in substance, if not form, [are] securities."' 33 The
34
holding in Turnerwas later referred to by the Supreme Court in Forman.1
The Court in Forman reiterated the test used by the Turner court and the
broad interpretation of the term "solely."'' 35 The FonnanCourt stated that
they expressed no view on the holding in Turner and that they did not
address the "solely" issue."' Based upon the Supreme Court's
interpretation of an "investment contract" in prior decisions, the court
should adhere to a broad interpretation of "solely." A broad interpretation
of "solely" supports the remedial nature of the legislation and the central
purpose of full and fair disclosure. 37

128. See id.
129. See id. at 479. The court stated that, "a literal application of the Howey test would
frustrate the remedial purpose of the Act." Id. at 480. Furthermore, promoters would easily evade
the coverage of the Act by requiring some perfunctory participation by the investors. See id.
130. Seeid. at483.
131. Id. (citing Glenn W. TurnerEnters., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482).
132. Turnerinvolved a pyramid investing scheme whereby participants received bonuses by
bringing in new members. See 474 F.2d at 478. Participants would bring prospective members to
meetings where the employees run the meetings and do the selling. See id. at 479.
133. Id. at482.
134. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
135. See id.
at 852 n.16.
136. See id.
137. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). The Court stated that the
definition of a security "embodies a flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits." Id.
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5. Summary
In summary, an investment contract involves a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money 3 ' in a common enterprise 39
and is led to expect profits 40 solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party.1 41 The requirement of an investment in money is unambiguous
and involves the laying out of something of value to produce revenue.
A common enterprise has not been addressed directly by the Supreme
Court, but has been held to include both vertical and horizontal
commonality by the appellate courts.'43 The expectation of profits was
interpreted by the Fornnan" nd Daniel 45 Courts, to mean an investment
with the expectation of receiving revenue or gain from the investment.
Finally, "solely from the efforts of others" has been broadly interpreted to
mean that investor participation will not remove the transaction out from
under the umbrella of an investment contract.
D. Conflict in the Statutory Definition
The legislature has enumerated many instruments in the statutory
definition that are familiar to the average investor. 146 The statutory
definition includes well known instruments such as "any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, ... , any put, call, straddle, option ...."'47
If the purpose of the legislature is to "protect the public"'148 as stated by
President Roosevelt in his speech to the House of Representatives, then the
courts must construe all enumerated instruments in the statutory definition
as a security regardless of the economic reality of the transaction. To do
otherwise, would create false security by the investing public. The average
investor purchasing a security or a note does so with the expectation that
the legislature has passed laws that provide federal relief from fraudulent
activities. However, if per se coverage was intended by the legislature, the
legislature would not have included the language "[w]hen used in this title,

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
(1994).
147.
148.
note 27.

See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 103-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying texL
Forman, 421 U.S. at 837.
Daniel,439 U.S. at 558-60.
See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7Bc(a)(10)
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. I.1.,
at 1-2 (1933), reprintedin 2 LEmISLATWE HISTORY, supra
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unless the context otherwise requires-."149 The courts have used the
context clause to evaluate the underlying economic reality of transactions
to remove transactions that in form are covered by the act, but in substance
clearly indicate that the legislative intent was not to provide a federal
remedy for such transactions."
1. An Over- or Under-Inclusive Definition
It may have been Congress' intent to provide a definition that was not
over-inclusive by allowing the underlying economic reality of a transaction
to be considered through the context clause language. If the context clause
language was dropped from the definition, the court would not have the
freedom to remove a transaction from the Acts coverage. For example, the
1t would have erroneously held that the stock in question
court in Fonnan"
was a security. Thus, without the context clause language, the resulting
definition would create a per se finding that all enumerated instruments in
the definition were securities. 15 Such a holding would result in an overinclusive definition and hinder the legislative intent of the Securities and
Exchange Acts.
The legislature also foresaw a need to create a definition that was not
under-inclusive. The legislature could not enumerate every instrument or
transaction that it intended to cover by the Acts. Instead, the inclusion of
an undefined instrument, an "investment contract," allowed the courts to
judicially mandate a test to evaluate transactions that would normally
escape the Acts coverage. Inclusion of the "investment contract" language
provided a means to capture unorthodox transactions that were not
securities in form, but were securities in substance. 3 Therefore, the

149. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
150. See generallyLandrethTimberCo.v. Landreth,471 U.S. 681 (1985) (explainingthat the
sale of stock is the typical context to which the Acts normally apply); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that the context clause provides authority to remove a transaction from
the Acts' coverage).
151. 421 U.S. at 837 (holding stock in a housing co-op was not a security because the stock
was not bought with intent to invest money with a profit expectation). Without the use of the
context clause, the court would find per se that the stock in question was a security. See id. at 848.
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (offing of units of a citrus grove
development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing and sharing of profits is a security
under the Acts); SECv. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding pyramid
selling scheme constituted an "investment contract" for purposes of the securities laws, not
withstanding promoter's claim that the profits were not derived solely from the efforts of
individuals other than the investor); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding that self improvement contracts which primarily offered the buyer the opportunity
of earning commissions on the sale of contracts to others were "investment contracts" and thus
securities within the meaning of the Acts).
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"investment contract" language provided a definition that would not be
under-inclusive.
2. Inconsistent Results Arising from the Context
Clause and Investment Contracts
Critics have argued that the use of the context clause has caused
conflicting results in the Court's application of the tests defining a
security. 54 For example, if a court holds that a transaction satisfies the
elements of the Howey test, the court could still remove the transaction
from the Acts coverage through the use of the context clause.5 5 The
dichotomy arises because the definition of a security includes both specific
and generally enumerated instruments that qualify as a security.
This conflict is best seen in Marine Bank v. Weaver. 5 6 In Weaver the
respondents, the Weavers, purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit from
the petitioner, Marine Bank. 157 The certificate had a six year maturity, and
it was insured by the FDIC.'58 The certificate was later pledged to the bank
to secure a loan in the amount of $65,000 that was made from the bank to
Columbus Packaging Co.' 59 Columbus owed the bank $33,000 for prior
loans and was severely overdrawn on their checking aceount.'60
The owners of Columbus Packaging entered into an agreement with the
Weavers in consideration for securing the loan.' 6 1 The agreement stated
that the Weavers were to receive fifty percent of the net profits in addition
to $100 per month as long as the loan was being secured by the Weavers. 62
The Weavers also gained future veto power in regard to any future
borrowing by Columbus Packaging. 63 The Weavers alleged that the bank
officers informed them that the loan proceeds would be used as working
capital for the company.l' Instead, contrary to what the Weaver were told,
the proceeds were used to pay Columbus' overdue loans and their

154. See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of
'Security' The 'Context' Clause, 'Invesftent Confract' Analysi, and TheirRamifications, 40 VAND.
L. REV.489, 507 (1987).
155. See id. at 508-09.
156. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
157. See id. at 552. Notes that have a maturity of less than nine months are excluded from the
coverage of the Acts. See id. at 556.
158. See id. at 552.

159. See id. at 553.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. In addition to the monetary payments, the Weavers had received use of the
Owner's barn and pasture, at the owner's discretion. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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overdrawn checking account.1 65 The bank then refused to allow Columbus
to overdraw on its checking account prospectively. 166 Columbus went
bankrupt four months later. 67 The bank informed the Weavers that the
therefore, it intended to claim
other security on the loan was inadequate;
168
the pledged security of deposit.
The Weavers filed suit in the federal district court alleging that the bank
violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.169 The
Weavers also alleged violation of the securities laws of Pennsylvania and
common law fraud. 70 The district court granted summary judgment for the
bank holding that if a violation occurred, it did not involve the sale of a
security.' 7, The Weavers appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the lower courts holding.172 The Circuit Court held that the
agreement between the Weavers and the owners of the Packaging plant
constituted a security. 173 The court also held that the pledge of a certificate
of deposit is a sale of a security under the Acts. 74
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded the
case to the circuit court to determine if the federal court should hear the
pendant state claims. 75 The Supreme Court stated that "the coverage of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws is not limited to the instruments
traded at securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets, but extends
to uncommon and irregular instruments." 176 However, the court went on to
the Acts, did not intend to create a federal
state that Congress, in passing
177
remedy for all transactions.
In reversing the lower court's holding, the Supreme Court held that the
certificate of deposit in the case at bar was not a security. 178 The Court
stated that even though a certificate of deposit is enumerated in the
definition of a security, the instrument enumerated in the Act refers to

165. See id. The bank applied approximately $42,800 to satisfy Columbus' prior loans and
overdrawn checking account. See id.The majority of the remainder was used to pay overdue taxes
and to satisfy other creditors. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 554.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 555
174. See id. The circuit courts were split on the issue of whether a pledge of a security was a
sale. See id. at n.2.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 556. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10
(1971)).
177. See id.
178. See id. at 557.
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"'certificates of deposit' ... issued by protective committees in the course
of corporate reorganizations.' ' 9
The circuit court also stated that the certificates of deposit are similar
to any other long term debt generally held to be a security."8 The Supreme
Court argued that the circuit court's finding was erroneous."' The Court
stated that certificates of deposit differ greatly from ordinary debt
obligations because certificates are issued by a federally regulated bank
which is subject to the regulations of the banking industry.8 2 In addition,
the court stated that certificates are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation." 3 Thus, holders of certificates are guaranteed
payment, but holders of long term obligations assume the risk of
insolvency.' Furthermore, the Court used the context clause to remove the
transaction from the Exchange Act's coverage.18 5 The Court relied on the
fact that the certificates were subject to other antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, therefore, the context of the transaction required
otherwise.8 6 Consequently, the certificates of deposit were not
securities. 7
The circuit court had also stated that the separate agreement between
the Weavers and the owners of the packaging plant was a security.I8 Under
the Howey test, the court held that the Weavers invested money, with the
expectation of profits, in a common enterprise, "solely from the efforts of
others."'8 9 However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts
analysis. "9The Supreme Court held that the agreement negotiated was not
offered to the public, the veto power held by the Weavers over future loans
gave them some measure of control over the operation of the plant, and the
agreement was different from ordinary instruments considered to be
securities. 9 1 Thus, even though there was a sharing of profits between the
92
parties, the Supreme Court stated that the agreement was not a security.
179. Id. at n.5.
180. See id. at 557.
181. See id.
182. See id. Certificates of deposit "are protected by the reserve, reporting and inspection
requirements of federal banking laws." Id.
183. See id. at 558.
184. See id. at 559. In addition, the Weavers argued that if the certificates were found not to
be a security, then the certificates were transformed into a security when they were pledged to the
bank. See id. at n. 9.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 560.
192. See id.
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The Supreme Court concluded that the certificates of deposit were not
securities because they were protected by other federal remedies. 193 The
court also rejected the argument that the certificate should be treated like
any other long term obligation subject to the Exchange Act's coverage.'I
Instead, the court used the context clause to remove the transaction from
the Act's coverage.' 95 Congress, in providing a federal remedy for
securities fraud, did not intend to only provide remedies to those
transactions that were not protected by another federal regulation." 9 One
of the primary purposes of the Act was to forbid fraudulent inducement to
trade based upon misleading or false information." Therefore, the Court's
reliance on alternate federal remedies was misplaced.
The Supreme Court also held that the agreement between the owners
of the packaging plant and the Weavers was not a security under the
Howey analysis. 98 However, the Court erred in its analysis. First, the Court
stated that the Weavers possessed control over the operation of the
slaughter house through their veto power over future loans. 9However, the
courts have held in past decisions that the inquiry to determine if the
"solely from the efforts of others" has been met should be "whether the
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant
ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise."' Therefore, the Supreme Courts holding in Weaver
either was incorrect or it limited the holdings in Koscot and Turnerto their
facts. It is clear that the Supreme Court in Weaver did not intend to limit
the Koscot or Turnerdecisions. Therefore, the Court erroneously held that
the control exerted by the Weavers removed the transaction from the
coverage of the Exchange Act. The transaction between the Weavers and
the packaging house owners was a security. All four prongs of the Howey
test were met, yet the Court removed the transaction from the reach of the
Act using the context clause."' The Weaver holding is a prime example of
the Court's misuse of the context clause in removing what would otherwise
be a security under the Act.
Another error in the Court's holding stems from the treatment of each

193. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 41. Nowhere in the Exchange Act does it state that protection under the
Act is only available to those transactions not covered by another federal remedy. See Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
197. See supra note 41.
198. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
199. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560.
200. Koscot, 497 F.2d at 483 (quoting Turner,474 F.2d at 482). The Court held that a literal
interpretation of the Howey test would frustrate the purpose of the Acts. See id. at 480.
201. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560.
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transaction as a separate and independent transaction. The Court, in
analyzing the transactions, should have collapsed both transactions into
one. Under this approach, the Court should have evaluated the overall
transaction using the investment contract theory. The collapsed transaction
analysis is discussed in Part IV.B.1. of this Casenote using the proposed
definition of a security.
In President Roosevelt's message to Congress, he stated that "[t]he
purpose of the legislation... is to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business."2 2 To carry out this purpose Congress
attempted to balance competing interests when creating a working
definition that would provide a federal cause of action to transactions that
involved securities. Unfortunately, in Congress' attempt to provide a
working definition of a security, an internal conflict between the "context
clause" and "investment contract" language emerged. In Weaver a
transaction that should have been covered by the Acts was removed by use
of the "context clause."2 3 Such a result was never intended by Congress.
Thus, the "context clause" and "investment contract" language cannot
coexist in the statutory definition without causing erroneous results when
applying the definition. In order to eliminate inconsistent holdings that run
contrary to congressional intent, a new working definition of a security
must be written. Part IV of Casenote paper suggests a working definition
that will satisfy the congressional intent of the Acts and provide consistent
and predictable results.
E. Stock-Presumptivelya Security Per Se
Prior to LandrethTimber Co. v. Landreth2 °4 the circuit courts were split
in the application of the "sale of a business" doctrine.20 s In response to the

202. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. I.l., at 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGIsLATivE HISTORY, supra
note 27.
203. See supra notes 157-97 and accompanying text.
204. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
205. See LandrethTimberCo. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,471 U.S. 681
(1985). The Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits recognized the sale of a business doctrine. See
id. at 1351 (citing Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982); Christy v. Cambron, 710
F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342,345 (11th Cir. 1982)). However,
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth circuits had rejected the sale of a business doctrine
following the presumption of a security. See id. at 1351-1352 (citing Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d
1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 n.3 (3d Cir. 1979); Coffin v.

Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1979); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th
Cir. 1983); Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1982)). The sale of a business
doctrine applies the Howey test to determine if the sale of stock comes under the control of the
Securities Acts. See id. at 1351. If the purchasers of the stock assume control of a company, they
are not considered investors expecting a profit from the efforts of others under the Howey Test. See
id. Therefore, the stock purchased is not a security under the Acts. See id.
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differing positions of the circuit courts, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue regarding the sale of a controlling interest in a business in
Landreth.' 6 In Landreth, the respondents Ivan K. Landreth and his son
owned all of the stock of a lumber business which they managed and later
placed on the market for sale.2 Before a sale could be made the sawmill
was badly damaged by a fire.2"' Samuel Dennis was solicited regarding the
sale.' The offering document disclosed the fire damages, but advised that
the respondents were rebuilding and predicted increased productivity.210
Based upon the representations made in the offering, Dennis and a
partner purchased the outstanding stock of the company. The stock was
then transferred to a newly formed corporation which then merged with the
lumber company. 212After the purchase of the company was complete, the
rebuilding of the mill exceeded estimates and the modernized equipment
was not compatible with the existing equipment.213 Profit expectations after
the purchase were not realized and eventually the petitioner sold the mill
at a loss and went into receivership. 1 4
Petitioner later filed suit seeking $2,500,000 in damages and rescission
of the sale of the stock under the Securities and Exchange Acts. 215 The

respondent moved for a summary judgment arguing that the sale of the
company stock was not covered by the Acts because the petitioner did not
buy a "security" under the meaning of the Acts. 216 Respondent argued that
the sale of business doctrine removed the sale of the securities in question
from the coverage of the Acts. 2 7 The district court ruled that even though
206. 471 U.S. at 681.
207. See id. at 683. The family offered their stock through both in state and out of state
brokers. See id.
208. See id. The sale of the lumber company was pursued despite the sale and prospective
purchasers were advised that the mill would be completely rebuilt. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. Before the purchase Dennis and his partner had the company audited and the mill
inspected. See id. After the audit and the inspection a stock purchase agreement was negotiated,
with Dennis as the purchaser of the stock. See id. The agreement specified that Ivan Landreth would
stay on as a consultant to help with the daily operations of the business. See id.
at 683The resulting company from the merger was Landreth Timber Co. See id.
212. See id.
84. Dennis and his partner owned 85% of the resulting company represented by the Class A stock.
See id. The remaining 15% of the company was owned by six other investors through the
outstanding Class B stock. See id.
213. See id. at 684.
214. See id.
215. See id. Petitioner alleged that the stock of the lumber company was sold without
registering it as required by the Securities Act. See id. Petitioner also alleged that the respondent
made fraudulent representations and failed to disclose material facts regarding the value of the
company and future expectations. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
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the stock possessed all the attributes of stock under the statutes, it would
follow the trend of the majority of the courts holding that the sale of 100%
of the stock of a corporation is exempt from the Securities and Exchange
Acts by the sale of business doctrine." 8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
holding and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
district court's
19
reversed.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by examining the
applicable statutes.22 The Supreme Court stated that in Formanit held that
most instruments bearing the name of an instrument mentioned in the Acts
are likely to be covered by the statutes.22 The Court further stated in
Formanthat an instrument bearing the name mentioned in the Act does not
222
conclusively determine that the instrument is a security under the Act.
Instead, the court must look to determine whether the instruments in
question possess "'some of the significant characteristics typically
associated with' stock." 2 The Court stated that if the instrument bears
some of the characteristics of a stock and is called a stock, the purchaser
may assume that the instrument is covered by the Acts.224
The Court held that the instrument in the instant case contained all the
usual characteristics as set forth in Forman; therefore, the instrument is
covered by the Acts.2' The Court distinguished Forman from prior
holdings by stating that prior cases involved unusual instruments not easily
characterized as a security.226 In contrast, the instrument in Forman is
traditional stock, plainly within the definition of a security under the

218. See id. The district court relied on the analysis set forth in Forman holding that a stock
could not be considered a security unless the purchaser anticipated profits from the efforts of others.
See id. at 685. The district court held that the sale of 100% of the stock was not an investment with
the expectation of profits from the efforts of others, but rather the transaction was a commercial
venture. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 686 (citing Forman,421 U.S. at 850).
222. See id.
223. Id. (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 851).
224. See id. The court in Formanidentified the usual characteristics of a stock as (1) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon the apportionment of profits; (2) negotiability; (3) the ability
to be pledged; (4) the right to vote in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (5) the
capacity to appreciate in value. See Forman,421 U.S. at 851.
225. See Landreth,471 U.S. at 687. The Court stated that holding that the securities laws were
applicable to the transaction comported with Congress' purpose of passing the acts in order to
protect investors by "compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."' Id.
(quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (quoting H.R. REP. No.73-85, pt. 111.2., at 11 (1933))).
226. See id. at 690. Therefore, the Supreme Court stated that if the Acts were to apply at all
to these prior unusual cases, the court would have to look to the underlying economic reality of the
transaction. See id.
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Acts.227 Thus, there is no need to look to the underlying economic reality
of the transaction.2 28
In addition, the Supreme Court also addressed the per se treatment of
stock as a security.229 The Ninth Circuit in its opinion was concerned with
the treatment of stock as a security provable by its characteristics.2 30 The
Supreme Court addressed these concerns in its Landreth opinion.23 ' The
Supreme Court pointed out several reasons why stocks may be
distinguished from other instruments.2 2 First, traditional stock represents
to most people the standard of a security.2 3 Second, stock is easily
identified because it is consistently defined. 234 Therefore, the Court held
that a presumption exists that a stock is a security under the Acts.
The Supreme Court further addressed the applicability of the sale of

business doctrine to the sale of a controlling interest in a company. The
Court in Landreth stated that the applicability of the sale of business
doctrine depends on whether control has passed to the purchaser.2 35 The
Court determined that the sale of business doctrine is not applicable to the
sale of a business and effectively overruled the applicability of the
doctrine. 23 6

1. Summary
In summary, the Landreth Court overruled the applicability of the sale
of business doctrine.237 The Court further established that there is a
presumption that a stock is a security under the Acts. 238 The courts will not

227. See id.
228. See id. TheCourt stated thattheHowey economic reality test is used to determine whether
an instrument is an investment contract. See id. at 691. It, however, should not be used to determine
if the instrument fits one of the enumerated instruments listed in the definition. See id.
229. See id. at 694.
230. See id. at 693. The circuit court feared that to allow a per se treatment of stock as a
security merely by looking to the underlying characteristics would open the door to the same
treatment for all other listed instruments. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. Persons trading in stocks whether an amateur investor or one skilled in the art have
basic expectations that transactions involving instruments called stock are covered by the Acts. See
id.
234. See id. Stock is easily identified by a plain and consistent definition that covers all types
of stock. See id.
235. See id. at 696.
236. See id. at 696-97. The court held that the application of the doctrine to the transaction at
bar opens up every sale of stock to application of the doctrine. See id. This would lead to unknown
coverage by the Acts for a purchaser at the time the stock is sold. See id. Coverage could not be
determined until extensive discovery and litigation has begun. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
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look to the underlying economic reality of the transaction unless the
instrument lacks the usual characteristics of a stock as set forth by the
Supreme Court. Such treatment creates a rebuttable presumption that a
transaction in the form of a stock is a security under the Acts unless
rebutted by the defendant.239
2. Is the Presumption Correct?
The holding in Landrethraises an interesting dilemma, would the result
have been the same if the transaction was structured differently? For
example, what if the Landreths' had sold the lumber company by selling
the assets of the company instead of the stock? Had the transaction been
structured as suggested, the security laws would never have been raised.
Thus, the definition of a security under the Acts raise problems that are not
reconcilable using the statutory language. However, these conflicts can be
eliminated by rewriting the statutory definition eliminating the use of
enumerated forms and stating abroad definition that is representative of all
security transactions.
The Court in Landreth erred in its analysis because they failed to
examine the underlying economic reality of the transaction. The transaction
between Dennis and the Landreths was private in nature and similar to a
sale of all the assets of the Timber Company. Thus, the Court ignored the
nature of the transaction, relying primarily on the fact that the transaction
was in the form of stock. The facts of the Landreth case will be reexamined under the proposed definition in Part IV.C.2.
F. Notes-The Family Resemblance Test
When the Supreme Court addressed the presumption of a security when
dealing with stocks, the court deferred addressing the treatment of notes.
Five years later, the question regarding notes was brought before the
Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 2" The issue in Reves was
whether demand promissory notes are securities under the Acts. 241
In Reves, the Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma sold
uncollateralized and unsecured promissory notes payable on demand in
order to raise money to support general business operations.242 Farmer's
Cooperative filed for bankruptcy and the holders of the notes as a class

239. See id.
240. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
241. See id. at 58.
242. See id. The notes were sold both to members and non-members and marketed as an
investment program. See id. at 59. The notes paid a higher interest rate than local financial
institutions. See id. Farmer's Cooperative advertised that the notes were not federally insured, but
they were safe and secure and available when needed. See id.
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sued the auditors.24 Petitioners prevailed at trial and Arthur Young
appealed. 2" Respondent claimed that the demand notes were not securities
under the Acts.24 The Eighth Circuit agreed and reversed the district
court's decision. 2' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
holding of the Eighth Circuit.247
In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court stated that "[u]nlike
'stock,' we said, 'note' may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that
encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending
on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some
other investment context."" 8 The Court stated that the Landreth formula
cannot be applied to notes; therefore, some other principle must be
developed to define the term note. 9 Many of the appellate courts have
considered the issue regarding notes and have adopted an "investment"
versus "commercial" distinction.' ° These approaches look to the
underlying economic reality of the transaction to determine if the note is
issued in an investment setting, which are securities, or in a commercial
setting, which are not."1
In Reves the Court stated that the term "any note" cannot be taken in its
most literal sense and must be interpreted to mean a note for investment
purposes. 2 The Court in making such a determination adopted a modified
version of the family resemblance test as stated by the Second Circuit."3
The family resemblance test begins with the language of the statute which
243. See id. The petitioner alleged that the auditors intentionally failed to properly value an
asset of the Farmer's Cooperative in order to inflate the net worth of the cooperative. See id. The
petitioners claimed that had the assets been properly valued they would not have purchased the
promissory notes. See id.
244. See id. Petitioners were awarded a $6.1 million judgement. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 62. (quotingLandreth, 471 U.S. at 694 (citing Securities Indus. Assn. v. Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 149-53 (1984))). The Court stated that notes differ
from stocks in that they can be used in a variety of settings not all involving investments. See id.
249. See id. at 63.
250. See id. The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits follow the investment versus
commercial test. See AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426,431
(9th Cir. 1978).
251. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 64. The Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits applied the Howey test
to notes. See id.; AMFAC Mortgage, 583 F.2d at 434 (holding that promissory note given lender
was not making investment ofrisk capital under the risk capital test). The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits follow the investment versus commercial test. See AMFAC Mortgage,583 F.2d at
431. The investment versus commercial test relies on the congressional intent that the securities
laws were enabled to protect investors in investment transactions and not commercial transactions.
See id.
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states that a "security" is to include "any note." 4 This statutory language
creates a rebuttable presumption that all notes are securities."
The Court stated that the presumption that a note is a security was
acceptable because Congress intended to regulate the investment market,
but not create a federal remedy for fraud. 2 6 Thus, in order to rebut the
presumption of a security, the defendant must show that the note in
question bears a resemblance to one of the instruments identified as a
commercial note. 7 Furthermore, as transactions come before the courts
that establish a need for a new class, the courts can create new families of
transactions as necessary to carry out the congressional intent of the
Acts. 5
The Supreme Court in Reves espoused a three part test in applying the
family resemblance test. 9 First, a court must examine the transaction in
order to assess the motivations that would prompt a reasonable buyer and
seller to enter into the transaction.26 If the seller's purpose in entering the
transaction is to raise working capital "or to finance substantial
investments and the buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is
expected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a 'security.' 2 6 1If on the
other hand the note was issued to raise money for minor assets or to correct
for cash flow problems of the business, or for some other consumer
purpose, the note is less likely to be categorized as a "security."'262
The second step is to determine the plan of distribution of the note in
question.263 A note is more apt to be held as a security if it is traded for
speculation or investment.2" In Formanthe Supreme Court stated that an
instrument that is purchased for some reason other than with an investment

254. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 65.
255. See id.
256. See id. The Second Circuit created a list of notes that they considered to fall on the side
of a commercial note and not within the protection of the securities laws. See id. These notes
include: 1) notes delivered during consumer financing; 2) notes secured by a mortgage on a home;
3) short term notes secured by a lien on a small business or its assets; 4) short term notes secured
by an assignment of accounts receivable; and 5) notes for working capital of a business. See id.The
Supreme Court in Reves agreed that the preceding notes are not securities under the Acts. See id.
257. See id. at 67.
258. See id.
259. See id.
at 66.
260. See id.
261. Id. Generally, notes that are treated as a security are of the type that the purchaser enters
into with the intent of generating a profit from the purchase and sale of that note. See id.
262. See id. Notes that are entered into for the purpose of charging a usury fee as in consumer
notes such as credit cards, car loans, boat loans, etc. are not entered into for investment purposes.
Thus, these types of consumer loans rebut the presumption of a security.
263. See id.
264. See id. For example, the most basic form of an instrument traded for speculation or
investment would be corporate bonds traded on the stock exchange.
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265
purpose cannot be considered a security under the Acts.
The third step is to look to the reasonable expectations of the investing
public.2' The court will generally hold that a instrument is a security on
the basis of public expectations even when the underlying economic
analysis of the circumstances might suggest otherwise. 267 The final step is
scheme that is in place to
to determine if there is some other
268 regulatory
reduce the risk of the instrument.
The Supreme Court stated that "in determining whether an instrument
denominated a 'note' is a 'security,' courts are to apply the version of the
'family resemblance' test" that it articulated in Reves. 269 The Court in
Reves found that the demand notes were securities.27 ° The Court stated that
the Farmer's Cooperative sold the notes to raise capital for its general
business operations and purchasers bought them in order to earn a profit
in the form of interest.27 With regard to a common plan of distribution, the
Court noted that the Farmer's Cooperative held the notes out for purchase
over an extended period of time to its members. 27 2 In addition, the notes
were offered and sold to a broad segment of the population and that was all
that was necessary to establish a "common trading" in an instrument. 3
Applying the third prong of the family resemblance test the Court
looked to the public's reasonable expectations regarding the instrument.274
The Court stated that the advertisements for the notes stated that they were
an investment. 275 There were no other offsetting factors that would have led
a reasonable person to challenge this classification.276 Therefore, it was

265. See 421 U.S. at 851. The Court determined that stock purchased to acquire the right to
state subsidized housing was not purchased for an investment purpose. See id. The stock could not
be pledged, was not negotiable, raised no rights to dividends or conferred any voting rights in
relation to the number of shares owned. See id. In determining whether an instrument is a security,
the courts must keep in mind the true purpose of the Acts. Congress passed the Acts with the sole
purpose of protecting the American investor from fraudulent activities involving the issuance of
securities. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
266. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
267. See id. at 67.
268. See iL
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. See id. The Court found that the fact that the interest rate of the demand notes were to be
continuously revised to pay a higher rate than that paid by local banks and savings and loans was
a factor in determining that the purchasers invested for a profit. See id. at 68. The court stated that
profit in the context of notes, means a valuable return on an investment which includes interest. See
id. at n.4.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 69.
276. See id.
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reasonable for the purchasers to believe that the Farmer's Cooperative was
selling the notes as investments.277
In Summary, the Reves Court overruled the "Risk Capital" test. The
court stated that the proper test in evaluating notes was the family
resemblance test.27 The family resemblance test creates a rebuttable
presumption that the note in question is a security.279 In determining
whether the presumption can be overcome, the court must look to several
factors that analyze the economic reality of the transaction.28 The elements
of the family resemblance test are very similar to the elements of the
Howey test. 281 There is also familiarity among the other tests used by the
courts in determining whether a security is involved. In any case, all tests
look to the underlying economic reality of the transaction in determining
whether a security is involved.
IV. REWRiTING THE DEFINrIoN OF A SECURITY
IN LIGHT OF A SINGLE TEST: HOWEY

Over the years the Supreme Court has promulgated many tests to deal
with the varying transactions that have come before the it.2" 2 When

277. See id.
278. See id. at 67.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. In Howey, the Court looked at several factors to determine if an investment contract was
a security under the Acts. The Court in Howey stated that a security exists if: 1) there is an
investment of money; 2) in a common enterprise; 3) with an expectation of profits; 4) solely from
the efforts of others. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The Court in Reves stated that a note is a security
if: 1) "the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business enterprise... and the
buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate. . . "; 2) there is a
"common trading for speculation or investment" of the note, or some other general plan of
distribution; 3) the public reasonably expects that the note is a security that is covered by the acts;
4) there are no other regulatory schemes that significantly reduce the risks associated with the
instrument. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-68. In either test, the court is looking to the underlying economic
reality of the transaction to determine if the transaction involves a security.
282. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 56 (evaluating promissory notes of a farmers' cooperative
under the family resemblance test); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) (holding 50% sale
of stock of a closely held corporation was a security under the Acts); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (holding 100% sale of stock of company does not create a
presumption of securities); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding certificate of
deposit and guaranty agreement are not "securities" within the meaning of the Act); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (holding Security and Exchange Acts do not
apply to an interest in a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan because this plan is not an
investment contract); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (holding shares
of stock allowing buyers to lease apartment in a state subsidized nonprofit housing cooperative were
not "securities" following the Howey test and the risk capital analysis); Howey, 328 U.S. at 293
(holding units of citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating and marketing
is a "security").
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confronted with transactions involving stocks, the Court has held that
stocks are presumptively a security unless the plaintiff can show
otherwise." 3 Notes were distinguished by the Supreme Court by using the
family resemblance test.2" All other non-conforming transactions that did
were evaluated using the
not fit under one of the enumerated instruments
285
Howey test as an "investment contract.9
As discussed earlier, the Howey test has been used to capture all
transactions that fall outside the enumerated instruments listed in the
statutory definition. 6 Because the Howey test is the rudimentary definition
of a security, for non-traditional transactions, the test establishes the
fundamental elements that define all securities under the Acts. All
transactions covered by the Acts involve an investment of money, with the
expectation of profit, in a common enterprise, and solely from the efforts
of others .287 Hence, the statutory definition of a security should be rewritten
using the Howey test as the benchmark for evaluating whether a transaction
involves a security.

283. See, e.g., Landreth, 471 U.S. at 681 (holding 100% sale of stock of company does not
create a presumption of securities); Forman,421 U.S. at 837 (holding stock not a security based
on the economic reality of the transaction).
284. Seesupra notes 240-81 and accompanyingtext. In followingthefamilyresemblancetest,
the Supreme Court overruled the use of the risk capital test. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64. The risk
capital test was developed and followed by the Ninth Circuit. See Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d
1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). In Underhill, the appellees purchased promissory notes from the
appellant with the expectation of a 10% return on their investment. See id. at 1429. The funds were
used by the appellant to purchase, at a discount, third party promissory notes. See id. The
promissory notes were secured by deeds of trust. See id. The appellant's beneficial interest in the
purchased trust deeds secured the obligations owed to the appellees. See id. During the early 1980s
the recession hit and many individuals defaulted on the purchased notes. See id. The appellant filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, leading to a suit by the appellees claiming that the notes were securities
under the Securities and Exchange Acts. See id. at 1429-30. The circuit court held under the risk
capital test that the promissory notes sold by the appellants were securities under the Acts. See id.
at 1435. The court stated that "the ultimate question is whether the funding party 'contributed "risk
capital" subject to the "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts" of [others]."' Id. at 1431 (alteration
in original) (quoting United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977)).
The circuit court listed six factors, non-dispositive, that they considered to determine if "risk
capitar' was involved. See id. at 1431. These factors include: "1) time; 2) collateralization; 3) form
of the obligation; 4) circumstances of issuance; 5) relationship between the amount borrowed and
the size of the borrower's business; and 6) the contemplated use of the funds." Id. The court held
that the inducement to purchase the notes by the appellees was a return on capital with a profit of
10 percent. See id. Furthermore, the reliability of the underlying securities was left to the skill and
business judgment of the appellants. See id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had
not erred in finding that the loan agreements were securities under the Acts. See id.
285. See supra notes 74-145 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 74-145 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 74-145 and accompanying text.
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A. PublicPolicy and the Howey Test
When fashioning a new definition for a security, it is important to keep
in mind the original intent of Congress when it promulgated the Securities
and Exchange Acts. Congress stated that it intended to provide a federal
remedy to protect all investors from both fraudulent investments and
fraudulent misrepresentations in investing.288 The use of the Howey test as
the benchmark for defining a security will provide investors and the
judiciary with a stable and predictable method of determining the Acts'
coverage.
First, the suggested defimition of a security will accomplish the original
Congressional intent because the courts will look to the underlying
economic realities of the transaction when applying the definition. In
applying the proposed definition to a transaction, the courts will apply the
elements of the definition forcing them to evaluate the underlying
economic reality of the transaction. Therefore, the "context clause"
language is not necessary in the revised definition. The context clause
language was a necessary evil in the original definition because some
transactions that were in the form of an enumerated instrument, such as
stocks, 289 were not investments in substance.
Secondly, the use of a modified Howey test as the revised definition
29
eliminates any conflicts that plagued the original definition of a security.
The revised definition is neither over- nor under-inclusive because all
transactions that satisfy the four elements of the new definition will qualify
as a security. The courts defined the investment contract language by
looking to the essential characteristics of a security. The Howey court
stated that the elements of the Howey test "embodies a flexible rather than
a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits .,291 The suggested definition allows courts
to disregard the form and always look to the substance of the transaction.
After all, Congress' original intent when passing the Acts was to
provide a federal remedy for fraudulent transactions involving securities.292
Congress did not intend to only provide a federal remedy to transactions
that were not covered by other federal remedies. 29' Therefore, under the
revised definition, courts do not have the discretion to remove a transaction
that qualifies as a security, as in Weaver,"9 by using the "context clause."
288. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

289. See Fornan,421 U.S. at 851.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
328 U.S. at 298.
See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 6.
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558.
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The purpose of the "context clause" was to provide a method for courts to
look to the substance over the form of a transaction. The proposed
definition allows courts to make the same evaluation, regarding economic
reality, without giving courts the opportunity to make capricious decisions
that are contra to Congressional intent.295
B. Definingthe Breadth of the Elements
Under the proposed definition of a security, a modified Howey test, the
breadth of each element must be defined. As in the original Howey test, the
proposed definition includes the following four elements: 1) an investment
of money; 2) expectation of profits; 3) in a common enterprise; and 4)
solely from the efforts of others.29 The following subsections describe the
breadth of each element of the proposed definition and interpretation the
courts should use for each element.
1. Investment of Money
An investment in "money" refers to the laying out of something of
value."9 The Acts should cover all offers and sales regardless of the
consideration that is paid in the bargain.29z The "investment" portion refers
to a transaction where the purchaser must have some expectation of a
return of revenue or gain in the future.29 Therefore, the transaction must
be one that is an investment and not a commercial transaction.
The investment-commercial evaluation can be made by examining the
motivations that would prompt a reasonable buyer and seller to enter into
the transaction." 0 If the seller's purpose in entering the transaction is to
raise working capital or finance substantial investments, then the
transaction is an investment and satisfies the "investment of money"
element.01 The courts must also look to see whether the transaction is one
entered into for speculation. Generally, transactions that involve the risk
of capital appreciation or depreciation are entered into for investment
purposes.

295. See id.
296. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
297. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
298. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,560 (1979). The Court, in
Daniel,stated that in finding a security under the Acts "in every case the purchaser gave up some
tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the
characteristics of a security."
299. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
300. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
301. See id.
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2. Expectation of Profits
When interpreting the "expectation of profits" element of the proposed
definition, courts must look to see if the investor would have some
expectation of receiving a return on his investment. The Forman court
stated that to satisfy the "expectation of profits" element, the transaction
must involve an "investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others."3" Thus, when evaluating whether an
expectation of profit exists, courts must look 1) to the expectations of the
investors prior to entering the transaction, and 2) to see whether the
investor expects profits in the form of income or appreciation.
3. Common Enterprise
A common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and successes of those
seeking the investment or of third parties. 3 3 A common enterprise can take
on two forms either vertical commonality or horizontal commonality.3"
Horizontal commonality ties the fortunes of each investor together and
"requires a sharing or pooling of funds."3' 5 Horizontal commonality is best
analogized to a chain link. Where each investor's fortunes are tied
inextricably to the next investor's.
Vertical commonality exists when the investor relies on the efforts of
the promoter. 3 6 The Second Circuit, in Revak v. SEC Realty Corp.,
distinguished between broad and strict vertical commonality.' Under
broad vertical commonality, the "fortunes of the investors need be linked
only to the efforts of the promoter."3 8 Under strict vertical commonality,
the fortunes of the investor are tied directly to the fortunes of the

302. 421 U.S. at 839. The Court held that neither of the kinds of profits expected by investors
were found in the transaction. See id. The investor could not receive appreciation in the value of
the stock nor expect revenues from their investment. See id. In fact, the information bulletin
distributed to prospective tenants stressed the non-profit nature of the project and the focus was on
the ability to acquire a place to live. See id
303. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973).
304. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994).
305. Id. The Revak court distinguished between broad and strict vertical commonality. Under
strict vertical commonality, the fortunes of the investor are tied directly to the fortunes of the
promoter. See id. at 88. See id. Under broad vertical commonality, the "fortunes of the investors
need be linked only to the efforts of the promoter." Id. The court did not address the issue of
whether strict vertical commonality was enough to meet the common enterprise element.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Id. at 88.
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promoter." Vertical commonality is best analogized to the hub and spokes
of a wheel. The hub being the promoter and each individual spoke
representing an investor. As in the hub and spoke, each investor relies
solely on the promoter to produce the fortune being sought.
Looking back to the underlying intent of the legislation, the reach of the
Securities and Exchange Acts should cover all transactions that attempt to
defraud public investors. Therefore, it should not matter whether the
scheme involves one investor and one promoter, as in vertical
commonality situations, or multiple investors pooling their assets to derive
a profit allocable to all investors, as in a horizontal commonality scheme.
The objective of the Securities Act was to protect the investing public from
misrepresentation and fraud in the offering of a security.310 Therefore, both
vertical and horizontal commonality should suffice in meeting the common
enterprise element.
4. Solely from the Efforts of Others
"Solely from the efforts of others," taken in its most literal sense would
require that the investor look completely to the promoter for their
expectation of profits. However, as stated by the Koscot court, the inquiry
to determine whether the "solely from the efforts of others" element is met
should be "whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are
managerial efforts which
the undeniably significant ones, those essential
' 31
affect the failure or success of the enterprise. '
The court in Turnerfaced similar facts and circumstances as the Koscot
court.312 The Turnercourt, in reaching a determination that the investment
scheme was a security, stated "in light of the remedial nature of the
legislation, [and] the.., policy of affording broad protection... the word
'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal limitation..., but rather
must be construed realistically,... to include.., schemes... involv[ing]
in substance, if not form, securities., 313 The legislature, in adopting the
proposed definition should adhere to a broad interpretation of "solely." A
broad interpretation of "solely" supports the remedial nature of the
legislation and the central purpose of full and fair disclosure. 1 4

309. See id.
310. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
311. 497 F.2d at 483 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th
Cir. 1973)).
312. Turner involved a pyramid investing scheme whereby participants received bonuses by
bringing prospective members to meetings where the employees ran the meetings and did the
selling. See 474 F.2d at 479.
313. Id. at 482.
314. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The Court stated that the definition of a security "embodies
a flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
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5. Summary
In summary, the proposed definition of a security includes a transaction
16
15
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits" 7 solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party. 1 The requirement necessary to qualify as an investment in
money is unambiguous and involves the laying out of something of value
to produce revenue. Thus, when evaluating whether an expectation of
profit exists, courts must look first to the expectations of the investors prior
to entering the transaction, and second to see whether the investor expects
profits in the form of income or appreciation. A common enterprise should
include both vertical and horizontal commonality. The expectation of
profits is satisfied by an investment with the expectation of receiving
revenue or gain from the investment. Finally, "solely from the efforts of
others" must be broadly interpreted to mean that investor participation will
not remove the transaction from the umbrella of the definition.
C. Application of the ProposedDefinition to Specific Situations
The proposed definition is very similar to the Howey319 test. Therefore,
application of the suggested definition to investment contracts will produce
the same results as the Howey test. Furthermore, the application to stocks,
as in Forman2° would also produce the same results as the original court
holding. Therefore, the suggested definition should continue to produce
correct results with most transactions that have previously been held to be
a security. However, the proffered definition should also produce the
appropriate results when applied to unusual transactions, such as, general
partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies and
unorthodox transactions. The following sections address the application of
the proposed definition to several transactions that were previously
discussed in this article and compares the results to actual court holdings.

variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits." Id.
315. See supra Part IV.B.1. and accompanying notes.
316. See supra Part IV.B.3. and accompanying notes.
317. See supra Part Iv.B.2. and accompanying notes.
318. See supra Part IV.B.4. and accompanying notes.
319. See 328 U.S. at 299.
320. See 421 U.S. at 839.
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1. Notes-MarineBank v. Weaver
As discussed in Part 1m.D.2. of this Casenote, the decision in Weaver
was flawed.32 ' The Court used the context clause to remove a transaction
from the Exchange Act's coverage. 322 The Court also erred in their analysis
regarding the transactions involved in the case. The Court should have
collapsed the multiple transactions and evaluated the result under the
investment contract analysis. Such treatment will be examined under the
proposed definition.
In Weaver the respondents, the Weavers, purchased a $50,000
certificate of deposit from the petitioner, Marine Bank.323 The certificate
was later pledged to the bank to secure a loan in the amount of $65,000
that was made from the bank to Columbus Packaging Co."2
The owners of Columbus Packaging entered into an agreement with the
Weavers in consideration for securing the loan. 3' The agreement stated
that the Weavers were to receive 50% of the net profits in addition to $100
per month as long as the loan was being secured by the Weavers. 26 The
Weavers also gained future veto power in regard to any future borrowing
by Columbus Packaging.327 The Weavers alleged that the bank officers
informed them that the loan proceeds would be used as working capital for
the company. 28 Instead, contrary to what the Weavers were told, the
proceeds were used to pay Columbus' overdue loans and their overdrawn
checking account. 29 The bank then refused to allow Columbus to overdraw
on their checking account prospectively. 30 The bank informed the Weavers
that the other security on the loan was inadequate; therefore, it intended to
claim the pledged security of deposit.33 ' In analyzing the facts of this case
the pledging of the certificate as security for the loan and the agreement
between the Weavers and the owners of the packaging plant should be
combined and evaluated as one transaction.
The first step of the analysis is to determine whether the Weavers made

321. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
322. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
323. See id. at 552. Notes that have a maturity of less than nine months are excluded from the
coverage of the Acts. See id at 556.
324. See id. at 553.
325. See id.
326. See id. In addition to the monetary payments, the Weavers had received use of the
Owner's barn and pasture, at the owner's discretion. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See id. The bank applied approximately $42,800 to satisfy Columbus' prior loans and
overdrawn checking account. See id. The majority of the remainder was used to pay overdue taxes
and to satisfy other creditors. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 554.
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an investment of money. In this case, the Weavers gave a certificate of
deposit as security for the loan by Columbus with Marine Bank.332
Therefore, the Weavers gave up something of value. Furthermore, the
driving motivation of the loan by Columbus was to raise working capital
for Columbus' operations. The Weavers also entered the transaction for
speculative purposes, because Columbus could have defaulted on the loan
and the Weavers potentially would lose all or a portion of their investment.
Thus, the Weavers made an investment of money when they pledged their
certificate of deposit as a security.
The second step involves a determination of whether the investment of
money was made with the expectation of profits. The Weavers expected a
return of interest from their certificate of deposit. However, even more
pertinent was the expectation of fifty percent of the net profits plus $100
per month for every month that the certificate was pledged as security for
the loan.333 Thus, it is undeniable that the Weavers entered the transaction
with the expectation of profits.
Next, the existence of a common enterprise, either vertical or
horizontal, must be found. In the Weaver case horizontal commonality
does not exist because there is only one investor, the Weavers, and two
promoters, Marine Bank and the owners of the packaging plant. The
Weavers' profits were both linked and directly tied to the efforts of the
owners of the packaging plant. Therefore, a common enterprise based on
vertical commonality existed between the investor and promoters.
The last step of the test involves determining whether the expectation
of profits are derived "solely from the efforts of others." As stated
previously, "solely" should be interpreted in a broad fashion. The efforts
made by the owners of the packaging plant are undeniably significant
compared to the ability of the Weavers to veto future loans. The essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise were
carried out solely by the owners of the packaging plant. Therefore, the
expectation of profits expected by the Weavers from the monetary
investment in a common enterprise rested solely on the efforts of the
promoters, resulting in a transaction involving a security.
The purpose of the security laws are to protect individual investors
from the fraudulent acts of promoters. In this case the promoters
fraudulently misrepresented the use of the loan proceeds to the Weavers.
Congress intended to provide a federal remedy to investors based on the
underlying economic reality of the transaction." The Weaver case
provides a clear example where the promoters cloaked a transaction in an
obscure form to elude coverage of the Acts. This result deviates from the
332. See id. at 553.
333. See id.
334. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975).
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original Supreme Court holding. As previously argued, the court erred in
separately evaluating the two transactions. Furthermore, the Court
erroneously used the "context clause" to remove a transaction that involved
a security because other federal remedies were available to the Weavers.
2. Stocks-LandrethTimber Co. v. Landreth
As discussed in Part Ill.E. of this article, the decision in Landrethwas
flawed. The Court in Landreth held that the sale of all the stock of a
business involved a security transaction.335 In making their determination,
the Court stated that "the stock involved here possesses all the
characteristics we identified in Forman as traditionally associated with
common stock....
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning
of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securities"
subject to the coverage of the Acts."336 The court deferred to the plain
meaning of the statute in deciding this case instead of looking to the
underlying economic reality of the transaction.33 In doing so, the court
erroneously found that the transaction should be covered by the Acts. The
suggested definition forces the courts to evaluate the substance over the
form. The following analysis applies the proposed definition to the facts in
Landreth.
In Landreth the respondents, Ivan K. Landreth and his son, owned all
of the outstanding stock of a lumber business that they operated and placed
on the market for sale.338 Before a sale could be made the sawmill was
badly damaged by a fire.339 Samuel Dennis was solicited regarding the
sale.' The offering document disclosed the fire damages, but advised that
the respondents were rebuilding the mill and predicted increased
productivity.341 Based upon the representations made in the offering,
Dennis and a partner purchased the outstanding stock of the company.34 2
The stock was then transferred to a newly formed corporation which
then merged with the lumber company.' The newly formed corporation
335. See 471 U.S. at 687.
336. Id. at 687.
337. See id. at 691-92.
338. See id. at 683.
339. See id. The sale of the lumber company was pursued despite a fire, and prospective
purchasers were advised that the mill would be completely rebuilt and modernized. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id. Before the purchase Dennis and his partner had the company audited and the mill
inspected. See id. After the audit and the inspection a stock purchase agreement was negotiated,
with Dennis as the purchaser of the stock. See id Landreth insisted on the sale of the stock instead
of a sale of the assets of the mill. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th
Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
343. Theresultingcompanyfromthemergerwas LandrethTimberCo. SeeLandreth,471 U.S.
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then entered into a consulting agreement with Ivan Landreth to assist in the
operation of the mill." Profit expectations after the purchase were not
realized and eventually the petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into
receivership. 45 "
The proper starting point is to determine whether the purchasers of the
lumber mill invested money. The facts of this case clearly establish that
Dennis paid a sum of money to acquire the stock of the lumber mill.
Therefore, there is no question of fact regarding the investment of money
element of the test. The next question is whether the investment of money
was made with an expectation of profits. The facts of the case state that
Dennis entered the transaction based upon the claim by Landreth that the
mill's productivity would increase after the renovation. Thus, there is no
question whether the transaction was entered into with the expectation of
profits.
Step three involves an examination of whether the transaction involved
a common enterprise. As stated previously, a common enterprise can exist
either horizontally or vertically. The facts of Landreth support the
existence of broad vertical commonality. Dennis' expectation of profits are
linked to the efforts of Ivan Landreth. Landreth and Dennis contracted for
Landreth's consulting services in the operation of the business.346
However, the purchase of the lumber mill was not contingent upon the
consulting contract between Landreth and Dennis. 47 Instead, the
consulting contract was entered into after the stock transaction was
completed. The consulting agreement was terminable with 30 days
notice."S Therefore, the expectation of fortunes was not directly linked to
the efforts of the promoter.
The last step in the Howey analysis is to determine whether the
expectation of profits rested solely on the efforts of the promoter. The facts
show that Dennis and the other investors had sole control over the lumber
company.349 Mr. Landreth's role was to act as an consultant in the
operation of the mill in an advisory role.35 Mr. Landreth specifically
declined to manage the mill causing the owners to hire another manager.35 '
The facts of the case show that Mr. Landreth had no actual or apparent

at 683-84.
344. See id. Landreth originally declined the purchaser's offer to stay on and manage the mill.
See Landreth, 731 F.2d at 1350. Instead Landreth agreed to a one year consulting agreement that
was terminable with 30 days notice by either party. See id.
345. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 684.
346. See id. at 683.
347. See id.
348. See Landreth, 731 F.2d at 1350.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id.
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control of the lumber company. The substantial efforts driving the
expectation of profits rested solely on Dennis, the investors and the mills
manager. Therefore, contrary to the Supreme Courts holding, the
transaction did not involve a security.
V. CONCLUSION

Many events led to the promulgation of the Securities and Exchange
Acts. Unscrupulous investment transactions, market speculation, and
margin transactions. 2 all led to the great stock market crash termed, the
"Great Depression." In response to these events, President Roosevelt and
Congress deemed it necessary to pass legislation to protect all investors
from fraudulent transactions and the promoters who prey on unsuspecting
investors." 3
In addressing the concerns raised by the crash of the market, Congress
passed the Securities Act in 1933 and the Exchange Act the following
year.354 The primary purpose of the Securities Act was to protect investors
during the initial offering of a security.35 The Securities Act has two basic
objectives: to provide the investor with enough information to make a
sound economic decision in purchasing a security, and to hold the issuers
liable for any misstatements or any other fraudulent activities in the
issuance of securities.35 6 Both acts contained substantially the same
definition of a security.35 7 This definition is used to determine whether the
Acts apply to the transaction in question.
The definition of a security under the Acts in its current form has
created inconsistencies in the application of the Acts. 5 ' One reason for the
inconsistencies arises because the definition enumerates both specific
instruments and broad undefined instruments such as an "investment
contract.3 5 9 When using the "investment contract" analysis, the courts are
able to evaluate the underlying economic reality of the transaction .3 ' The
courts are also able to evaluate the underlying economic reality of a
transaction involving an enumerated instrument through the use of the
"context clause."36 ' However, some courts have incorrectly used the
"context clause" to otherwise remove a transaction that is a security under

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
See SKOUSEN, supra note 1, at 19.
Comparesupra note 5 with supra note 6.
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.B.-D.
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the "investment contract" analysis.36 2 The existence of both the "context
clause" and "investment contract" language in the statutory definition
create a fertile environment for inconsistencies.
The proposed definition for a security will force the courts to evaluate
the underlying economic reality of the transaction in question regardless of
the form.3 63 This treatment will help to produce more consistent and
predictable results in the application of security law. Although no
definition is without fault, the Howey test provides all those who look to
securities law with the fundamental characteristics of a security. All
securities involve an investment of money in a common enterprise, by
investors, with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others.
Such a definition accomplishes Congress' intent. The proposed definition
allows the legislature to provide a federal remedy to defrauded investors.
However, the suggested definition will cause less confusion because it
contains the fundamental underlying characteristics of a security without
the added confusion brought about by the "context clause" and specifically
enumerated transactions.

362. See supra Part III.D.2.
363. See supra Part IV.
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